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Every state in the United States with an income tax offers some kind of tax break to its older citizens. These breaks are often sizable, result-
ing in an elderly household owing substantially less in 
income taxes than a non-elderly household with the 
same income. In Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Michigan, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania, married 
elderly households can have incomes well over $100,000 
and not owe any state income taxes at all. Such tax 
breaks come at considerable cost to state coffers, a cost 
that is almost certain to grow as the elderly population 
grows in both size and economic status. Yet there is 
little evidence that these tax breaks are providing states 
with any economic benefit, and the savings are skewed 
toward those in little need of public support. 
These tax breaks appear to be expanding. Since the 
beginning of 2017, legislators in at least thirteen states 
have proposed or established significant expansions: 
• Laws eliminating all taxes on Social Security 
income have been proposed in Vermont, Montana, 
and Minnesota, with projected annual budget costs 
of $30 million, $75 million, and approximately 
$425 million, respectively. Laws that would go 
further and exempt all pension income have been 
proposed in Connecticut and Nebraska.
• In January, Arkansas began exempting all military 
pension income from taxation, and similar laws 
are being considered in at least six other states. 
• After much debate last year, New Jersey enacted 
legislation doubling the $20,000 exemption on 
retirement income in 2017 and increasing it to 
$100,000 by 2020.
These examples demonstrate the substantial size 
of these tax breaks and their potential cost to state 
governments in terms of foregone revenues. The 
justifications typically given for these policies are that 
elderly households are stretched financially and are in 
need of these breaks, and that reducing the elderly’s 
income taxes will make the state a more attractive 
retirement destination, which is presumably good for 
the economy. Among the recent arguments:
Too many people in New Jersey face retirement 
with insecure incomes and too many retirees find 
it hard to make ends meet on their income. 
—NJ Senator Paul Sarlo, author of the bill to 
increase the pension exemption1 
These seniors are taking their pensions and fleeing 
to Florida and other states that do not tax it, and 
we want to keep them here where they pay taxes 
and contribute to our community. 
—NY State Senator Hugh Farley in 2016, 
pushing legislation, which passed in June, 
that would double the pension exemption to 
$40,000 at an annual cost of $275 million2 
We want people to stay in 
Connecticut and not leave for 
lower-tax states that don’t tax 
their pensions, especially our 
senior citizens. This is an issue 
of fairness. 
—CT State Representative 
Laura Devlin, propos-
ing legislation in January 
2017 exempting all Social 
Security and pension 
income from income taxes3
After describing how these tax 
breaks work, this brief explores 
whether there is convincing evi-
dence to support these arguments. 
We examine which taxpayers benefit 
most from these tax breaks and 
whether these policies are indeed 
helping the most economically 
vulnerable households. We then turn 
to the costs of tax breaks in terms of 
foregone state revenues and whether 
the breaks affect elderly persons’ 
location decisions in such a way that 
the tax breaks could, as some policy 
makers assert, pay for themselves.
Background and Our Tax 
Measures
State income tax breaks for the elderly 
typically fall into three categories (see 
Box 1): (1) deductions, exemptions, 
and credits given on the basis of age 
(usually age 65 or over), (2) exemp-
tions for Social Security benefits, and 
(3) exemptions for pension or other 
retirement income. 
Deductions, exemptions, and 
credits tend to be modest in size 
and have tracked federal income tax 
policy; thirty-five of the forty-four 
states with income tax systems offer 
some form of age-based tax break. 
Likewise, Social Security benefits 
are tax free for low-income house-
holds in all states and under federal 
tax law. For higher-income house-
holds, up to 85 percent of benefits 
are subject to federal income tax, 
with the portion increasing with 
income. The majority of states treat 
Social Security benefits as tax-free 
for all households, and the rest fol-
low at least the federal tax rules. 
On the third type of tax break, 
exemptions for pension or other 
retirement income, states differ from 
the federal government, which taxes 
all such income, and from each other. 
It is also the tax break that has expe-
rienced the most growth. As shown 
in Figure 1, in 2013 only twelve states 
offered no exemption at all, while five 
exempted all pension income and 
another ten allow between $20,000 
and $100,000 in pension income to 
be exempt from taxation. Both the 
number of states offering exemptions 
and the size of the exemptions have 
grown since 1990.
All three tax breaks tend to 
benefit middle- and higher-income 
taxpayers the most. Low-income 
households owe little tax, even with-
out these breaks, and these exemp-
tions are not refundable (that is, 
tax liabilities do not go below zero). 
Because Social Security benefits 
are based on earned income, they 
tend to be larger for higher-income 
households, and so a larger amount 
is exempt. However, higher-income 
households tend to receive a smaller 
proportion of their income from 
Social Security than do middle- or 
lower-income households, as shown 
in Figure 2 on page 4. Finally, the 
tax savings from all three types are 
greater the larger one’s marginal 
tax rate, and since most states have 
graduated income tax systems, 
the tax savings from these policies 
increase with income. 
The full effect of these tax breaks 
is more complicated than the level 
of the exemptions and the marginal 
tax rate because the policies are 
often linked and the definitions of 
retirement income vary. Some states 
include Social Security benefits or 
FIGURE 1. PENSION EXEMPTIONS AND CREDITS: 1990 AND 2013
Source: Brewer, Conway, and Rork, 2016, Table 1.
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1. Deductions, exemptions, and 
credits given on the basis of age 
(usually 65 and over)
• Exemptions and deductions are 
subtracted from taxable income, 
which reduces the tax liability 
by the amount of the exemption 
or deduction times the indi-
vidual’s tax rate.
• Credits are subtracted from the 
tax liability, and reduce the tax 
liability dollar for dollar. If the 
credit is refundable, the tax liabil-
ity can be negative, such that the 
household receives a payment 
from the government. Age cred-
its are generally not refundable.   
Example: The Johnsons have a tax-
able income of $50,000, on which 
they pay 10 percent in taxes, or 
$5,000.   
If they can claim an age exemption 
or deduction of $2,000, their taxable 
income is now $48,000, and they 
will pay $4,800 in taxes. The exemp-
tion/deduction saved them $5,000-
4,800 = $200, or the amount of the 
exemption ($2,000) times the tax 
rate (0.10) they would have paid on 
that $2,000. Key implications are:
• If the Johnsons had faced a 
higher marginal tax rate, the 
exemption would have saved 
them even more in taxes; for 
example, if their tax rate was 0.25, 
they would save $500 in taxes.
• In most tax systems, the mar-
ginal tax rate increases with 
taxable income; therefore, the 
tax savings from deductions and 
exemptions tend to be largest for 
the highest-income households.
• If the Johnsons’ taxable income or 
tax liability was zero initially, the 
exemption/deduction would be of 
no benefit to them. 
Turning to credits, if they can claim 
an age credit equal to $2,000, they 
will pay $5,000-2,000 = $3,000 in 
taxes. The credit saved them $2,000.  
If they can claim an age credit equal 
to $6,000, they will owe $5,000-
6,000 = minus $1,000 in taxes. If the 
credit is refundable they will receive 
a $1,000 payment from the govern-
ment.If it is nonrefundable, they 
will simply owe no taxes.
2. Exemption of Social Security 
benefits
For federal taxes, benefits are 
excluded for single/married house-
holds with provisional income below 
$25,000/32,000. Households with 
incomes above those thresholds must 
include a portion of their benefits in 
their federally taxable income; the 
portion increases as income rises, up 
to a maximum of 85 percent.  Even 
for the highest-income households, 
15 percent of benefits are exempt 
from income taxation.
States treat Social Security ben-
efits in three ways: (1) they don’t 
tax them at all, (2) they follow the 
federal law, or (3) they include some 
benefits in taxable income for high-
income households but at a lower 
rate than federal law.
3. Exemption of pension or  
retirement income
Many states exclude a certain 
amount of pension income from 
taxable income. These policies differ 
across states in:
• the amount of income that can 
be excluded (see Figure 1)
• the definition of pension 
income, ranging from very 
broad (including Social Security, 
wages, dividends, and interest) 
to narrow (only defined benefit 
pensions)
• the availability to high-income 
households, as exemptions are 
sometimes phased out with 
income
Just as with the age-based exemp-
tions, the tax savings from exempt-
ing Social Security benefits  and 
pension income is larger for high-
income households than for other 
households because high-income 
households typically face a higher 
marginal tax rate and they owe 
enough taxes to be able take advan-
tage of the reduction. Only a non-
refundable tax credit provides the 
same tax savings to all households. 
Availability of senior exemp-
tions, deductions, and credits
Of the 44 states with income tax 
systems:
35 offer an extra exemption, 
deduction, or credit based on age.
29 exempt all Social Security 
benefits from taxation.
5 states fully exempt pension/
retirement income from taxation.
27 states exempt some pension/
retirement income from taxation or 
offer tax credits for pension income.
Box 1: Three Tax Breaks for Seniors and How They Work
                                                                                                                                                         C A R S E Y  S C H O O L  O F  P U B L I C  P O L I C Y      3
even some earned income in their 
definition of the retirement income 
that can be exempt, while others 
phase out the exemptions for high-
income households or exempt only 
defined-benefit pension income.
We therefore create a summary 
measure of the tax benefits of being 
an elderly household for a variety of 
income levels and in every state, using 
household income data from the 
American Community Survey (ACS) 
and the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) TAXSIM calcula-
tor (see Box 2).4 We also use the ACS 
and decennial census data to provide 
information on the distribution and 
composition of income for elderly 
and non-elderly households. 
Distributional and 
Revenue Effects
The financial need argument for 
these tax breaks presumes that the 
elderly are a relatively needy group 
and that the tax breaks target the 
most economically vulnerable 
among them. Our research casts 
doubt on both notions. 
Historically, the elderly have had 
lower median incomes than the 
non-elderly, but this pattern has 
changed dramatically in the last 20 
years.5 While the average married, 
elderly household had total income 
equal to 64 percent of that of non-
elderly households in 1990, by 2013 
that percentage had grown to 101 
percent (that is, elderly households 
had slightly higher incomes). The 
data also show that the elderly 
have experienced a much smaller 
increase in income inequality than 
the non-elderly during this period. 
Some elderly households no 
doubt still experience substantial 
financial difficulties, especially those 
headed by single females (often 
widows). Do these tax breaks help 
those households? The answer is no, 
for several reasons. Most of these 
households’ income comes from 
Social Security benefits, which at 
these low income levels would not 
be subject to even federal income 
tax. Even if benefits were taxable, 
in most states these households 
would face little or no income tax 
because of their very low incomes, 
FIGURE 2. 2013 INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF ELDERLY HOUSEHOLDS, BY SOURCE*
Note: This figure is not to scale. Source: 2013 American Community Survey for married households with at 
least one member over age 65
Box 2. Measuring the Benefits 
for Taxpayers Age 65-Plus
Our calculated tax benefit mea-
sures the difference in the esti-
mated state income tax liability 
a household would face if it was 
elderly or not.  It is constructed for 
households at three points in the 
income distribution—bottom 25 
percent, median, and top 10 per-
cent. The measures are constructed 
according to the following steps:
1. 2013 ACS data are used to 
identify the level and sources of 
income for elderly households 
at the three income levels. 
2. NBER’s TAXSIM calculator 
is used to estimate the state 
income tax liability these 
households would face in 
every state with an income 
tax, given the level and 
sources of income.  
This step creates the current 
tax liability for the three elderly 
household types for every state.
3. To simulate the tax liability for 
these households if they were 
not elderly, TAXSIM recalcu-
lates the tax liability removing 
any age-based exemptions, 
deductions, or credits and 
switching all sources of 
retirement income into other 
income (which has no special 
exemptions).  
This step creates the tax 
liability for the three elderly 
household types for every state 
if they were not elderly. 
4. Subtracting #2 from #3 
yields the amount by which 
the estimated tax liability is 
lower because the household 
is over age 65 and receives 
income from retirement 
income sources.
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regardless of their age. In fact, to 
the extent that they receive income 
from wages, some of these very low 
income households are actually 
harmed by their age because after age 
65 they are no longer eligible for the 
often refundable Earned Income Tax 
Credit. To sum up, neither federal 
nor state income tax breaks target-
ing the elderly offer much help to the 
lowest-income households because 
these households would owe little or 
no income tax without them. To help 
these groups would require enacting 
refundable tax breaks or credits.
Our estimated tax benefit mea-
sures, summarized in Table 1 and 
Figure 3, underscore these conclu-
sions. Elderly households in the 
bottom 25 percent of the income dis-
tribution pay very little state income 
taxes, with an average of negative $10 
under current tax policy. Removing 
all state tax breaks, which includes 
the extreme policy change of making 
all Social Security benefits taxable, 
leads to a $131 average increase per 
year. Note that going in the other 
direction—that is, expanding existing 
tax breaks—would have little if any 
effect on their tax liability because 
such breaks are not refundable. 
It is the middle- and high-income 
elderly who benefit most from cur-
rent tax policy, and proposals to 
expand these tax breaks primarily 
benefit the highest-income taxpayers 
since the proposals would exempt 
even larger amounts of income. 
Elderly households at the median pay 
$809 less on average than if they were 
non-elderly, which results in them 
paying about 69 percent of what 
non-elderly households of the same 
income level pay. This tax benefit 
varies widely across the states, from 
zero in Tennessee (a state without a 
broad-based income tax) to $1,668 in 
Georgia. Figure 3 on page 6 shows a 
geographic pattern to these breaks, 
in which the southeastern and 
central Midwestern states offer the 
biggest tax benefits and the Plains, 
California, and upper Atlantic sea-
board offer the least.
While the top 10 percent pay 
almost 90 percent of what a non-
elderly household of the same 
income level pays, they still 
receive a sizable benefit on average 
($1,510), and recent and currently 
proposed expansions would benefit 
them the most. For example, in past 
work we estimate that a 2010 law in 
Georgia that would have increased 
the retirement exemption from 
$65,000 to $100,000 in 2013 would 
have had no benefit for the bottom 
75 percent of the income distribu-
tion.6 And because the tax liabili-
ties are large in dollar terms, this 
change would have cost Georgia 
$100 million in tax revenues. 
More generally, we estimate 
that the revenue costs of these tax 
breaks are often substantial. On 
average, the income tax revenues 
raised from elderly households 
would be 50 percent higher if all 
tax breaks were removed, equiva-
lent to about 7 percent of all state 
income tax revenues. This percent-
age will almost surely increase as 
the population ages, which census 
data show has not yet occurred but 
soon will. (The elderly make up 
18.4 percent of the adult population 
in each state on average, according 
to ACS data, a percentage that has 
barely increased since 1990; how-
ever, the Census Bureau projects 
the proportion of the elderly in the 
population to increase by nearly 
50 percent between 2010 and 
2030).7 Our calculations therefore 
underestimate the likely revenue 
impact of these policies in the 
years to come. In addition, these 
average impacts mask large varia-
tion across the states. Some states, 
such as Delaware (11.5 percent), 
TABLE 1. STATE TAX BENEFITS FOR MARRIED ELDERLY HOUSEHOLDS AT 
THREE INCOME LEVELS IN 2013
Note: The percentage in panel 3 for the lowest-income households is not useful since the tax liabilities are often 
negative. Source: American Community Survey and National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM calculator.






Household income $18,000 $37,400 $129,700 
1. Current estimated tax liability for elderly households
State average -$10 $1,865 $12,452
Maximum $33 (IL) $6,378 (DC) $24,867 (DC)
Minimum -$137 (NM) $343 (TN) $3,194 (NH)
2. Estimated change in tax liability if tax breaks removed
State average $131 $809 $1,510
Maximum $395 (IN) $1,668 (GA) $5,220 (GA)
Minimum $0 (NH) $0 (TN) $63 (NH)
3. Elderly tax liability as a percentage of the non-elderly tax liability [(1 divided by (1+2)) x 100]
State average NA 69% 89%
Maximum NA 100% (TN) 100% (TN)
Minimum NA 42% (GA) 63% (GA)
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Georgia (12 percent), Kentucky 
(11 percent), Michigan (14 per-
cent), Mississippi (12.6 percent), 
Pennsylvania (11.7 percent), and 
South Carolina (14.6 percent), lose 
far more than 7 percent of their 
income tax revenues to these tax 
breaks (see Box 3). These states 
are the ones that grant the largest 
pension exemptions and so serve as 
a benchmark for those states cur-
rently considering the large expan-
sions mentioned above (including 
Connecticut, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, 
and Vermont).
Our research therefore suggests 
that current tax breaks primarily 
benefit the middle- and upper-
income elderly and that further 
expansions, as currently proposed, 
would benefit primarily the highest-
income households. These tax 
breaks also come at a significant 
cost to the state in terms of rev-
enues. Policy advocates often argue 
that such tax breaks will “pay for 
themselves” by encouraging the 
elderly to remain in the state and by 
enticing more elderly to locate in 
the state—an assertion that brings 
us to the next section.
FIGURE 3: ELDERLY TAX LIABILITY AS A PERCENTAGE OF NON-ELDERLY TAX LIABILITY, MEDIAN INCOME, MARRIED 
HOUSEHOLDS, 2013
Source: American Community Survey and National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM calculator
Box 3: Revenue Foregone 
From Tax Breaks for the Elderly
50% = the average amount that 
income tax revenues from elderly 
households would increase if all 
current tax breaks were removed.
7% = the amount of total state 
income tax revenues forgone due 
to current state tax breaks for the 
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Do These Policies Affect 
Migration?
Elderly persons do not move 
between states that often: less than 
1 percent of the population age 65 
and over moves across state lines 
in any given year. Moreover, that 
number has been fairly steady over 
the last few decades and has been 
declining, if anything.8 Such a low 
rate of migration casts doubt on 
assertions such as those quoted 
above that the elderly are fleeing or 
flocking to states because of taxes. 
This low overall rate masks 
important variations across states, 
however, and policies could still 
be influencing the decisions of the 
small percent who do move. Table 2 
shows the top fifteen net receivers of 
elderly migrants and the top fifteen 
net senders (or “winners” versus 
“losers”). Not surprisingly, the top 
receivers tend to be Southern states 
with temperate climates, a low cost 
of living, and many natural ameni-
ties. These states also tend to have 
lower income tax burdens and large 
tax breaks for seniors (see Figure 
3). The reverse is also true in that 
the top senders tend to be Northern 
states with higher costs of living and 
heavier tax burdens. Given these 
broad differences between receiving 
and sending states, just how much 
of these migration patterns can we 
attribute to tax policy? Is it Florida’s 
weather or its lack of an income tax 
that makes it a draw for retirees?
Studying the relationship between 
changes in tax policy and changes in 
migration patterns allows research-
ers to better isolate the effects of 
tax policy from other state ameni-
ties such as climate, cost of living, 
and quality of life. We conducted 
a formal investigation into this 
relationship in a recent work.9 
Using four decades of decennial 
census data, we estimated regres-
sion models of elderly migration 
that control for other factors that 
could affect migration, such as 
weather and natural amenities, cost 
of living, unemployment rates, and 
other state policies and programs 
of interest to the elderly (like estate 
taxes and spending on hospitals).10 
We estimated several variants of this 
model, measuring the tax breaks 
in different ways to ensure that 
our results were not sensitive to 
one specification or variable. The 
models were also estimated for the 
high-income (top 25 percent) and 
low-income (bottom 25 percent) 
elderly separately, as we would 
expect the tax policies to have the 
stronger effect on the high-income 
elderly. Across all of these analyses, 
we failed to find any statistically 
significant effect of these income tax 
breaks on elderly migration.
A limitation of this work is that 
it ends in 2000. In the 2000s, the 
decennial census long form—the 
largest source of migration data—
was replaced with the annual 
American Community Survey. The 
ACS is a smaller dataset with a dif-
ferent survey process and different 
definitions of both residence and 
migration than the census long form, 
and the change in the form used 
makes extending our earlier analyses 
into the 2000s difficult.11 To ascer-
tain whether our earlier findings of 
no meaningful effect extend to the 
2000s, we perform two exercises.
First, we return to Table 2 and 
compare the migration patterns 
in 1990 versus 2010. Income tax 
breaks for the elderly have changed 
a lot during this time, while elderly 
migration patterns have been quite 
stable. For instance, thirteen of the 
top fifteen receivers in Table 2 were 
also top receivers in 1990; similarly, 
nine of the top fifteen senders in 
Table 2 were also top senders in 
1990. The fact that such tax poli-
cies have changed a great deal while 
elderly migration has not is a simple 
yet convincing piece of evidence 
that senior tax breaks are not a driv-
ing factor in location decisions.
Second, we make some back-of-
the-envelope calculations of the 
costs of using these tax breaks to 
TABLE 2. TOP NET RECEIVERS AND 
NET SENDERS OF ELDERLY MIGRANTS 
IN 2010
Note: * Denotes that the state was also in the top 15 in 
the 1990 census. The “net rate” is the number of net 
elderly migrants (in-migrants minus out-migrants) over 
a five-year period, divided by the state’s elderly popula-
tion, multiplied by 100. The sample is limited to the 48 
contiguous states. Source: 2006–2010 American Com-
munity Survey and Conway and Rork, 2016, Table 2.
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recruit the elderly under a best-
case scenario. We begin with the 
extremely optimistic assumption 
that all elderly migrants are mov-
ing because of income tax breaks 
and then calculate what each of 
those migrants “cost,” on average, 
in terms of foregone tax revenues. 
In 2012, 43.1 million people were 
over age 65. Applying a high rate 
of migration (1 percent) by histori-
cal standards to this number yields 
an estimated 431,000 migrants. We 
estimate that existing tax breaks cost 
the states $30.1 billion in 2012, or 
$69,837 per migrant. This exercise 
suggests that existing tax breaks cost 
the states nearly $70,000 per elderly 
migrant whom they could poten-
tially recruit. To put this number 
in context, note that the median 
income of an elderly person was 
less than $25,000 in 2012. These 
migrants would therefore have to 
generate economic benefits almost 
three times the size of their annual 
incomes for these tax breaks to “pay 
for themselves.” This high cost per 
potential migrant is not surprising 
given the low level of migration 
combined with the sizable revenue 
costs of these tax breaks. And if 
migrants are not much affected by 
tax breaks, as empirical evidence 
suggests, the cost of each migrant 
actually recruited by tax policy is far 
higher and therefore even less likely 
to be offset by any economic ben-
efits generated. In sum, we conclude 
that it is highly unlikely that these 
tax breaks pay for themselves.
Conclusion
Policies that reduce the state income 
taxes owed by elderly households 
are widespread and come in many 
forms. Such tax breaks result in 
elderly households paying substan-
tially less in income taxes than non-
elderly households with the same 
income, and the tax breaks come at 
a significant cost in terms of fore-
gone revenues. And yet many states 
are currently considering expanding 
these breaks. The primary reasons 
given by proponents of such expan-
sions are that the elderly are an 
especially needy group of taxpay-
ers and that such tax breaks will 
prevent the elderly from fleeing to 
other states with lower taxes.
This brief provides evidence refut-
ing both of these arguments. As a 
group, the elderly now have similar 
incomes and actually experience less 
income inequality than non-elderly 
households. Moreover, expanding 
these tax breaks will do little to help 
the most economically vulnerable 
among the elderly because such 
households already pay almost 
nothing in income taxes under cur-
rent policy. Increasing the amount 
of pension or Social Security ben-
efits that are exempt would instead 
help only those elderly much higher 
up in the income distribution. Our 
analyses further suggest that if state 
policy makers really want to help 
the poorest elderly households, 
they could consider extending the 
refundable Earned Income Tax 
Credit to those over age 65 or enact-
ing some other kind of refundable 
low-income tax credit such that the 
household could actually receive a 
payment from the government.
The idea that such tax breaks 
pay for themselves by attracting 
retirees into the state or discourag-
ing existing residents from leaving 
also finds little support. Census 
data show that elderly migration is 
a fairly rare event, with a pattern of 
movement that has remained stable 
for decades, despite many new 
tax breaks designed to attract the 
elderly. Our formal analyses like-
wise provide no consistent evidence 
that these tax breaks influence 
migration decisions in a meaningful 
way. Even if we cast this evidence 
aside and instead use extremely 
optimistic assumptions about the 
impact on migration, these tax 
breaks seem highly unlikely to pay 
for themselves.
If such tax breaks are expanded, 
our analyses suggest that higher-
income households will be the 
primary beneficiaries and that the 
change will do little to stem the 
flow of retirees leaving the state. 
Moreover, those foregone tax rev-
enues must somehow be paid for, 
presumably through cuts to spend-
ing—spending that could help the 
needy elderly or improve economic 
growth—or through increases in 
other taxes and fees.
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